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COMMENTARY
SUSAN N. HERM.NAN*
Both Governor Cuomo and Professor Bright, talking about some
of the problems with an elected judiciary that is too vulnerable to
political attacks, have recommended that the selection of state judges
move towards something closer to that of the federal system, where
judges are selected on merit and then given life tenure to protect their
independence. Governor Cuomo has done a wonderful and, as usual,
eloquent job of describing what kind of values judicial independence
is supposed to protect.
I think, though, that the political attacks on the judiciary are not
the problem but in fact a symptom of a much deeper problem. That
is, at this point there is virtual unanimity-not only among the public
but also among all three branches of the federal government-in los-
ing sight of the values that judicial independence was supposed to pro-
tect. Article HI suggests that federal judges are expected to take the
part of minorities, dissenters, and other politically powerless and un-
popular people, including criminal defendants. Governor Cuomo
mentioned Brown v. Board of Education,' which provides an example
of the heroism of federal judges who, although vilified in their own
communities, desegregated public schools in the South at a time when
political branches could not muster the will or ability to do so.
Today, among the areas that act as lightning rods for criticism of
the federal system is habeas corpus, an area quite familiar to Professor
Bright. I have long thought of federal judges who grant writs of
habeas corpus as heroes. Part of the reason is that the image that
comes to my mind when I think of federal habeas corpus is from the
beginning of the century, and it is the face of Leo Frank. In 1915, the
Supreme Court denied Leo Frank's habeas corpus petition3z The
judgment of history is that Leo Frank was a man who was convicted of
a capital crime not because he was guilty, but because he was a Jew
living in Georgia at the turn of the century, and the local passions and
prejudices blinded people to the fact that there was not very convinc-
ing evidence against him. Well, I think it is an understatement to say
that not everybody views federal judges as heroes when they grant
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2 See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
339
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
writs of habeas corpus. The current image is not Leo Frank but Ellis
Felker, a murderer with no sympathetic defense who presumably
brings multiple habeas corpus petitions only to delay his execution.3
Which of these images is the truth? I think the point is that they are
both true. There are both kinds of cases out there in the federal
courts, but the public gets a very distorted view of what's going on.
Judges, like any other group, tend to fall in a bell-shaped curve,
and it is always the decisions at one extreme end of the curve that
seem to be news. When the mayor or the police commissioner criti-
cizes a decision that he says has outrageously let a criminal go or has
outrageously set bail too low, that's news. It's all over the newspapers
and all over television. If a criminal defendant wants to complain that
in his or her case, bail has been set outrageously high, or that a judge
ridiculously has refused to suppress evidence, that is not news (and
here, I can say, "Present company excluded," about Bob Herbert). So
the public equates habeas corpus with the reviled Ellis Felker, the
same way that they have been led to believe that the role federal
courts are assuming in prison litigation is to ensure that prisoners get
their choice of chunky or creamy peanut butter, while I could docu-
ment that federal judges use their power to prevent the spread of tu-
berculosis and gang rape in prisons, not the spread of peanut butter.
Following Justice Holmes' great dissent in Frank v. Mangum,4 the
federal courts eventually got on the habeas corpus case. One Ameri-
can Bar Association report showed that between 1976 and 1991, in 40-
46% of capital cases that were reviewed on federal habeas corpus, the
courts found constitutional defects.5 To me, this shows not that the
federal judges were a bunch of liberal busybodies who needed to have
their sails trimmed, but that there is something deeply wrong in the
states' criminal justice systems. This group of judges-and this is at a
time when the majority of the federal bench were pedigreed conserva-
tive Reagan-Bush appointees-was shown what was going on in the
state criminal justice systems, and they were very troubled. But again,
the public is not encouraged to think that this record shows that Arti-
cle III was working as it should.
What I want to tell you about the federal experience is that the
process is not enough. When there is such a widespread consensus
that the values on the other side of democracy, those
countermajoritarian values, are not important, even the process does
not protect the federal courts. Look at what's happening in the fed-
3 See Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996).
4 237 U.S. at 345-50 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
5 See Memorandum from Professor James S. Liebman to Senator Joseph Biden, Chair-
man, Senate Judiciary Committee 1 (July 15, 1991) (on file with author).
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eral courts today. Maybe individual judges cannot easily be hounded
off the bench, because they have life tenure, but the federal courts are
being restricted, in a much more meaningful way, from hearing the
kinds of cases I just mentioned. Congress recently enacted, and the
President signed, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,6
which in fact puts so many restrictions on federal habeas corpus that
we're just about back to where we were at the time of Leo Frank. The
Prison Litigation Reform Act imposes procrustean limitations on
those busybody federal judges in prison conditions cases.7 So federal
judges have some actual restrictions and some actual protections, but
they also, even with their life tenure, feel some of the same pressure
that the state court judges feel.
I want to close by telling you where I was this past Friday. I was
in Massachusetts talking to the judges of the First Circuit, who were
convened partially in order to learn about how to conduct federal
death penalty trials in states that have no death penalty, such as
Massachusetts, Vermont, Rhode Island, and Maine. These judges
have no experience with death penalty cases, and some of them were
quite worried about being unpopular for the opposite kind of reason
that Professor Bright presented. They were going to have to preside
over cases that their communities did not believe in and did not agree
with. At the end of the talk, I found myself thinking about tonight's
panel, and wanting to thank those judges for being willing to under-
take what was designed to be an unpopular job.
And I want to tell you that in talking to these and other federal
judges I have met, I realized that they fell into two different catego-
ries. There are judges who are wearing their life tenure like a bullet-
proof vest, and they are doing as much justice as the current Supreme
Court and the revised statutes allow them to do. But then there are
other judges who sound like rape victims. They are traumatized, they
are looking back over their behavior, studying their behavior to see if
there is anything that they might have done to provoke these attacks,
and they are considering whether to play it safe in the future to avoid
attacks.
The process is not enough. I think we need more than that, and I
think we need to have conversations not only about what the mecha-
nism should be for judicial selection, but also about how we are going
to get the word out that the values that judicial independence is
designed to protect are crucial.
6 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Pub. L No. 104-132 110
Stat. 1214 (to be codified in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18,21,22,28,40,42,49,50 U.S.C).
7 See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L No. 104-134. 110 Stat. 1321 (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1932).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 19971
